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CREDIBLE UTILITY IN PATENT LAW 
The law relating to the patentability of products and methods of their use is one of the 
most vexing in the field of patent law. It was not always so. Take for example patents on 
novel machines. New machines are the work of inventors building on the inventions of others. 
Normally it is fairly easy to see if the machine does what it was designed to do and there is 
little question of the utility or industrial applicability of newly invented machinery. While 
mechanical inventions make use of modern science and mathematics, in their very essence 
mechanical inventions are not the product of the scientific revolution. Further, many 
inventions that are derived from the scientific revolution in fields such as for example 
electronics and computer related inventions fit the template developed for mechanical 
inventions. But does this template fit products found in nature in an impure state and 
subsequently isolated and purified by inventors? In addition, the same question can be asked 
about products made by chemical processes whose use or industrial applicability is not readily 
apparent.  
If we focus for a moment on products made by chemical processes which have no 
known use, such products can only be viewed at nonobvious if the process for making them is 
itself nonobvious. This fact pattern presents an important patent law question, does the 
product need to have a use or industrial applicability in order to issue a patent to its inventor 
beyond simply providing the product for experimentation designed to find uses for it? The 
general answer is yes . However, that answer will undoubtedly lead an inventor who has 
brought forth a product which has no known credible utility or industrial applicability to add 
some guesses to her patent application in the hopes that if she guesses correctly she will 
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obtain a valuable patent. If one of the guesses proves correct should this be treated in essence 
as a constructive reduction to practice sufficient to justify the grant of a valid patent?  
This paper suggests that the proper answer should be no because a sound patent system 
should not encourage guessing where there is no sound scientific basis for the guess. My 
analysis of how such guesses are treated in patent law starts with one of the most remarkable 
patent cases of the last decade,  Conor Metasystems v. Angiotech.
1
 It will end with a possible 
explanation of why the Federal Circuit may have created the new doctrine of description as 
applied to originally filed claims.  
CONOR METASYSTEMS v. ANGIOTECH    
Conor Metasystems involved the overturning of the decisions of two leading patent 
jurists, Lord Justice Jacob
2
  and the late Sir Nicholas Pumfrey
3
 by the House of Lords. Both 
jurists held that Angiotech’s taxol coated stent patent was invalid.  It is hard not to conclude 
from the facts set out in both opinions that the Angiotech inventors had made at most a trivial 
advance over the prior art, an advance unworthy of a patent. Unfortunately both jurists used 
obviousness to hold the patent invalid. I shall argue in this paper that the disclosure of the 
claimed invention was speculative and thus Angiotech’s patent should have been held invalid 
based on the speculative nature of the disclosure, a defense not raised by Conor Metasystems. 
Claim 12 of EP 706,376 (‘376), Angiotech’s patent, written in independent form 
without its redundant language reads 
12. A stent for expanding the lumen of a blood vessel comprising a generally tubular 
structure coated with taxol, or an analogue or derivative thereof, for treating or 
preventing recurrent stenosis. 
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In short, the claim is for a taxol coated stent used with angioplasties for treating or preventing 
recurrent stenosis (restenosis), a phenomenon often observed in clogged vessels opened by 
angioplasty. The patent suggests that taxol is a good drug to use for coating the stent to 
diminish restenosis. However, the idea of using a drug that attacks cell growth to coat a stent 
was old in the art. Medtronic’s WO  91/12779 patent application published two years before 
Angiotech’s filing date discusses various classes of drugs that may be used to coat the stent. 
Taxol was not specifically mentioned, but it was a member of a specific class of drugs 
discussed in the Medtronic application.   
 The Angiotech ‘376 specification is a lengthy document focusing on the testing of 
various compounds for their ability to block the formation of blood vessels, anti-angiogenesis 
compounds. The disclosed tests showed that taxol was a powerful inhibitor of angiogenesis. 
Based on these angiogenesis tests Angiotech’s inventors proposed the use of taxol coated 
stents for use in the palliative treatment of advanced cancer since the cancer itself often grows 
in a way that closes the lumen created by the stent. Given the scientific understanding at the 
time regarding angiogenesis and cancer, the use of an anti-angiogenic compound such as taxol 
on a stent placed in an area of a growing cancer to keep a body passage open for palliative 
treatment of that cancer made scientific sense. The theory of using drugs that block the 
development of new blood vessels as a method of treating cancers was not mentioned in 
Angiotech’s patent although it dates back at least to the 1970s owing to the pioneering work 
of the late Dr. Judah Folkman.   
But the lengthy Angiotech patent specification, however, almost as a throw away, 
includes the following paragraph: 
[0077] Within another embodiment of the disclosure, methods are provided for 
eliminating vascular obstructions, comprising inserting a vascular stent into a blood 
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vessel, the stent having a generally tubular structure, the surface of the structure being 
coated with an anti-angiogenic composition as described above, such that the vascular 
obstruction is eliminated. Briefly, stents may be placed in a wide array of blood vessels, 
both arteries and veins, to prevent recurrent stenosis at the site of failed angioplasties, to 
treat narrowings that would likely fail if treated with angioplasty, and to treat post 
surgical narrowings (eg dialysis graft stenosis). Representative examples of suitable sites 
include the iliac, renal and coronary arteries, the superior vena cava, and in dialysis 
grafts. 
 
Well there you have it, coat stents with an anti-angiogenic composition such as taxol and you 
can prevent restenosis, an overgrowth of normal cells caused by an attempt by the body to 
heal the artery after an angioplasty or stent placement. Obviously such an overgrowth can 
once more narrow the artery. There is no teaching whatsoever in the specification showing 
scientifically that anti-angiogenic compositions are the key to preventing this restenosis 
process. Indeed, there isn’t today any reason to believe that to be true as Lord Hoffmann 
conceded as much in his speech, but what is true is the speculation regarding taxol has proved 
to be true as applied to angioplasties. It is not surprising then to learn that the commercial 
success of taxol coated stents owes nothing to the teachings of the Angiotech patent. The 
useful patent covering taxol coated stents stems from work at NIH by James L. Kinsella and 
Steven J. Sollott, U.S. Patent No. 5,616,608  and its corresponding European patent EP 
711,158. Their work predated the filing date of Angiotech’s patent, but their patents had a 
convention filing date of a few days after Angiotech’s convention filing date, July 19,1993 
and July 29, 1993, respectively. Nevertheless, if one accepts that Angiotech’s application 
clearly stated that it believed that taxol was an excellent drug for use with a stent for 
angioplasties and that speculation has proven to be substantially true, then the conclusion of 
the House of Lords that claim 12 was not obvious was sound as there was no particularly 
teaching in the prior art that would single out low dosages of taxol for the prevention of 
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restenosis as a clearly superior drug for this specific purpose. Moreover, from the point of 
view of enablement, the specification most certainly taught one skilled in the art how to make 
a taxol coated stent. Of course had taxol not worked in this environment which was surely 
likely as of the filing date, the claim would not have been valid. 
Since the issue of industrial applicability was not raised in Angiotech on the theory that 
there was no scientific reason to believe that restenosis had anything to do with angiogenesis, 
the House of Lords did not have to deal with the speculative nature of the specification that 
supported claim 12. However, Sir Nicholas Pumfrey suggested that had it been raised he 
would have found the requirement of industrial applicability satisfied for he commented in the 
course of his opinion that “It is a fundamental principle that the disclosure of a specification 
to the skilled man at the relevant date is not to be assessed by reference to the work that the 
patentee had in fact done towards arriving at the invention claimed in the claims. It is entirely 
legitimate for a patentee to write a complete specification, experiments and all, without 
leaving his armchair, but he runs the risk of a finding of insufficiency if he gets anything 
wrong.” Given his belief in the legal soundness of speculative disclosures that prove to be 
true, it is not surprising that speculation was not raised before him as a defense. However, in 
Human Genome Sciences v. Eli Lilly
4
 there is at least a suggestion that Lord Justice Jacob 
does not agree with Sir Nicholas Pumfrey. 
HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES 
   Early in 2010 Lord Justice Jacob in Human Genome Sciences discussed speculation in 
patent specifications. The main issue in the litigation involving EP 939,804 (‘804) was 
whether the industrial applicability requirement was met by the specification supporting 
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claims covering a newly discovered gene for a protein identified as neutrokine-α (now named 
TNF SF13b), a vector containing this gene and most importantly a claim to antibodies to 
neutrokine-α . The stimulus for the litigation was claim 13 which apparently covers the 
antibodies disclosed in Lilly’s US patent No. 7,317,089. Claim 13 reads: 
An isolated antibody or portion thereof that binds specifically to (g) the full length 
Neutrokine-α polypeptide (amino acid sequence of residues 1 to 285 of SEQ ID NO: 2); 
or (h) the extracellular domain of the Neutrokine-α polypeptide (amino acid sequence of 
residues 73 to 285 of SEQ ID NO: 2). 
 
The ‘804 specification taught the role of neutrokine-α with reference to the group of 
proteins that belonged to the TNF family by using a computer analysis rather than by 
experimental data. The basic question for decision was whether its computer analysis was 
speculative or alternatively was enough to satisfy industrial applicability. An EPO Board of 
Appeal said the answer was yes
5
 and the UK courts said no.
6
  Both the EPO and the UK 
courts apparently believed that a speculative disclosure that turns out to be correct is not 
sufficient in contrast to the view of Sir Nicholas Pumfrey.  
Perhaps the most significant passage in the opinion of Lord Justice Jacob on appeal 
follows a discussion of Mr. Justice Kitchen’s holding at first instance that the specification 
was speculative: 
[133] The Judge thought his conclusion as to the speculative nature of the claims in the 
patent was confirmed by the subsequent history of investigations by both HGS and 
others, particularly into B cells and T cells. He set out the detail (which was not 
challenged) at 141 - 175. His summary is as follows:   
 
"176 The papers and work to which I have referred represent only a very small 
fraction of the work carried out on Neutrokine-α. Nevertheless, I believe the 
following general conclusions can be drawn from them and the expert evidence. 
From 1999 it became increasingly clear that Neutrokine-α is expressed by 
peripheral blood leukocytes, and in the spleen and lymph nodes. From that time it 
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also became apparent that Neutrokine-α plays a significant and particular role in 
the proliferation and differentiation of B cells. Subsequently it has also been 
shown to play a part in the regulation of T cell proliferation and activation. As the 
activities of Neutrokine-α have gradually been elucidated, and particularly those 
relating to B cells, it has become increasingly recognised as a potential 
therapeutic target for diseases that are specifically associated with altered B cell 
function. Notable amongst these are autoimmune diseases such as rheumatoid 
arthritis and SLE and B cell malignancies such as lymphoma. Neutrokine-α has 
now been shown to have an important role in the development of autoimmune 
disease and B cell cancers; but, at the same time, much of its biology remains 
unclear and is the subject of continuing study by many different research centres. 
In my judgment the nature and extent of all this research work, the limited 
conclusions ultimately drawn and the amount of work that remains to be done 
point strongly to the conclusion that the therapeutic and diagnostic applications 
suggested in the Patent were indeed speculative." 
 
 It seems to be clear from this passage that it was not good enough to set forth applications 
that might turn out to be true if there was no sound scientific basis for doing so as of the filing 
date. 
APOTEX v. WELLCOME FOUNDATION 
 
 Perhaps the leading case discussing speculative disclosures comes from the Supreme 
Court of Canada,  Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd.,
7
 a case involving the patenting, 
CP 1,238,277, of a new use for the old drug AZT, the world’s first anti-HIV drug. The 
question for decision by the Court was whether the listed Wellcome inventors were the only 
inventors of the claimed new use of AZT prior to the priority date, March 16, 1985. The 
Wellcome inventors were knowledgeable virologists who, when they learned that the HIV 
was a retrovirus, began to screen compounds that would interfere with a necessary retroviral 
function. The Court described this work: 
11. Once the Glaxo/ Wellcome team had identified suitable compounds, its in-house 
screening methods were relatively simple. Coating the bottom of a petri dish with 
murine (mouse) T-cells, the laboratory technician would introduce a retrovirus. Glaxo/ 
Wellcome used two retrovires found in mice (not humans) because they were readily 
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reproducible, predictable, reliable and easy to use. Using staining techniques, the 
laboratory technician could see if the virus spread, destroying the mouse T-cells. If the 
technician were then to add the candidate "remedial" compound, he or she could see 
whether the virus triumphed by continuing to kill the T-cells, or the compound 
triumphed by preserving the T-cells. In November 1984, during Glaxo/ Wellcome's 
multiple tests of known compounds, the AZT compound produced surprisingly good 
results, appearing to eradicate completely the retrovirus in the mouse T-cells. It proved 
more potent than any other compound tested. In argument in this Court, counsel for 
Glaxo/ Wellcome called this a "eureka moment", but this seems to be something of an 
exaggeration. There had been no testing in a human cell line (in vitro) or in humans (in 
vivo). The object of the exercise was to eradicate HIV in humans, not a mouse virus in 
a petri dish. 
 
At this point the Court commented that “It seems clear, and was found as a fact by the trial 
judge, that scientists at Glaxo/ Wellcome and elsewhere recognized that the immune systems 
of humans and mice are sufficiently different that it is not possible to predict from studies in 
mouse cells how a drug would work, if at all, in humans.” For the Court the question was 
whether, had an application been filed at this point claiming a method of treating HIV 
infections, would it have satisfied the utility requirement. The Court indicated that it would 
not have done so because, although the speculation proved to be correct, it did not believe it 
appropriate to allow patents for speculative disclosures even when such disclosures ultimately 
proved to be correct. 
 But the story does not end here for there were more developments before the March 16, 
1985 filing date. NIH had spend a great deal of time and effort to learn about the HIV virus 
and had developed a sophisticated drug screening technique using a human cell line (ATH8) 
which could be infected with HIV in vitro to provide information relevant to the ability of a 
drug to inhibit  the replication of HIV in T-cells. This work is described in U.S. Patent No. 
4,704,357.  Having developed this test, NIH announced that it would test any compound sent 
to it. As a result Wellcome sent AZT to NIH early in February without identifying the 
compound as AZT. On February 21, 1985 NIH reported to Wellcome that AZT did inhibit 
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HIV. Wellcome then disclosed to NIH the identify of the compound around the first of March. 
Hence NIH had vindicated the Wellcome hunch and at this point there could be little 
argument that a utility that was not speculative was shown. However, the Court correctly 
concluded that developing and running the assay to prove that AZT did in fact work did not 
make the NIH inventors jointly with the Wellcome inventors. As for the doctrine of “sound 
prediction” the Court explained: 
59   The doctrine of sound prediction seems to have had its genesis in a comment by Lord 
MacDermott in May & Baker Ltd. & Ciba Ltd.'s Letters Patent, Re (1950), 67 R.P.C. 23 
(U.K. H.L.), at p. 50 (where, however, he rejected its application on the facts). . . . 
 
60   The doctrine of "sound prediction" was given serious shape and substance by 
Graham J. in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Biorex Laboratories Ltd., [1970] R.P.C. 
157 (Eng. Ch. Div.). In that case the proposition was framed as follows, at p. 182:  
 
If it is really possible, according to the evidence, to make a sound prediction about 
a certain area, then prima facie it would be reasonable that the patentee should 
have a claim accordingly.... 
 
61   The doctrine was explicitly received into our law in Monsanto, supra. In that case, 
the Court was confronted with a patent that included claims to numerous chemical 
compounds to inhibit premature vulcanization of rubber, but only three of the claimed 
compounds had actually been prepared and tested before the date the application was 
filed. The examiner rejected the claims to the untested compounds, holding that "'broad 
product claims must be adequately supported by a sufficient number of [tested] 
examples'" (p. 1111). The rejection was upheld by the Patent Appeal Board and the 
Federal Court, but this Court reversed on the basis that the "architecture of chemical 
compounds" was no longer a mystery but, within limits, soundly predictable. . . . 
 
66   The doctrine of "sound prediction" balances the public interest in early disclosure of 
new and useful inventions, even before their utility has been verified by tests (which in 
the case of pharmaceutical products may take years) and the public interest in avoiding 
cluttering the public domain with useless patents, and granting monopoly rights in 




70  The doctrine of sound prediction has three components. Firstly, as here, there must be 
a factual basis for the prediction. In Monsanto and Burton Parsons, the factual basis was 
supplied by the tested compounds, but other factual underpinnings, depending on the 
nature of the invention, may suffice. Secondly, the inventor must have at the date of the 
patent application an articulable and "sound" line of reasoning from which the desired 
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result can be inferred from the factual basis. In Monsanto and Burton Parsons, the line of 
reasoning was grounded in the known "architecture of chemical compounds" (Monsanto, 
at p. 1119), but other lines of reasoning, again depending on the subject matter, may be 
legitimate. Thirdly, there must be proper disclosure. Normally, it is sufficient if the 
specification provides a full, clear and exact description of the nature of the invention and 
the manner in which it can be practised: H. G. Fox, The Canadian Law and Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions (4th ed. 1969), at p. 167. It is generally not 
necessary for an inventor to provide a theory of why the invention works. Practical 
readers merely want to know that it does work and how to work it. In this sort of case, 
however, the sound prediction is to some extent the quid pro quo the applicant offers in 
exchange for the patent monopoly. Precise disclosure requirements in this regard do not 
arise for decision in this case because both the underlying facts (the test data) and the line 
of reasoning (the chain terminator effect) were in fact disclosed, and disclosure in this 
respect did not become an issue between the parties. I therefore say no more about it. 
 
71  It bears repetition that the soundness (or otherwise) of the prediction is a question of 
fact. Evidence must be led about what was known or not known at the priority date, as 
was done here. Each case will turn on the particularities of the discipline to which it 
relates. In this case, the findings of fact necessary for the application of "sound 
prediction" were made and the appellants have not, in my view, demonstrated any 
overriding or palpable error. 
 
72  On March 1, 1985, Glaxo/ Wellcome received from the NIH the key results of the in 
vitro test of AZT against the HIV in a human cell line. This, taken together with Glaxo/ 
Wellcome's own data on AZT, including the mouse tests, provided a factual foundation. 
Glaxo/ Wellcome's knowledge of the mechanism by which a retrovirus reproduces, and 
the "chain terminator effect" of AZT, as disclosed in the patent, was found by the trial 
judge to provide a line of reasoning by which utility could be established as of the date of 
the U.K. patent application, March 16, 1985, which is also the priority date by which the 
invention must be evaluated for purposes of the Canadian patent. Although "sound 
prediction" was not the precise approach followed by the trial judge, his reasoning as well 
as his ultimate ruling is entirely consistent with its application. 
 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND “SOUND PREDICTION” 
While not using the expression “sound prediction”, the Federal Circuit essentially 
employed “sound prediction” in Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (In re 
'318 Patent Infringement Litig.). The key contribution of the inventor in Janssen was her 
suggestion that a known pharmaceutical, galanthamine, may well be effective in the treatment of 
Alzheimer’s disease, an inspired guess that proved to be true. However, the Federal Circuit 
believed there was no sound basis for this claimed utility. The Federal Circuit explained: 
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Janssen's '318 patent claims a method for treating Alzheimer's disease with 
galanthamine. Claim 1 is representative. It claims "[a] method of treating Alzheimer's 
disease and related dementias which comprises administering to a patient suffering from 
such a disease a therapeutically effective amount of galanthamine or a pharmaceutically-
acceptable acid addition salt thereof." . . . . The application for the '318 patent was filed on 
January 15, 1986, by Dr. Bonnie Davis, the claimed inventor. 
*** 
The specification for the '318 patent was only just over one page in length, and it 
provided almost no basis for its stated conclusion that it was possible to administer "an 
effective Alzheimer's disease cognitively-enhancing amount of galanthamine." . . . . The 
specification provided short summaries of six scientific papers in which galantamine had 
been administered to humans or animals. The specification summarized the first paper as 
showing that administering galantamine with the drug atropine to humans under anesthesia 
raised blood levels of the hormone cortisol, and the second paper as showing that 
administering galantamine and atropine together during anesthesia also raised levels of 
adrenocorticotropic hormone ("ACTH") in humans. . . . There was no explanation of the 
significance of increasing cortisol or ACTH levels, but it was known to those skilled in the 
art in early 1986 that the production of cortisol and ACTH was controlled by the central 
nervous system rather than the peripheral nervous system, and that the studies thus 
suggested that galantamine was able to cross the blood-brain barrier and have effects 
within the brain. 
The specification then provided brief summaries of four scientific papers reporting 
brain effects and positive effects on memory from administering galantamine to animals. . 
. . The first paper concluded that galantamine intravenously administered to rabbits 
affected brain wave activity. The second paper concluded that galantamine increased 
short-term memory in dogs. The third and fourth papers concluded that galantamine 
reversed amnesia in rats that had been induced by administering the drug scopolamine. 
The specification did not suggest that such scopolamine-induced amnesia was similar to 
Alzheimer's disease. The specification did not provide analysis or insight connecting the 
results of any of these six studies to galantamine's potential to treat Alzheimer's disease in 
humans. 
The specification noted that another prior art scientific paper described an animal 
testing model for replicating in animals the acetylcholine deficit and other effects of 
Alzheimer's disease. The specification agreed that acetylcholine deficiency in animals is a 
"good animal model for Alzheimer's disease in humans" because the deficiency produces 
"[n]umerous behavioral deficits, including the inability to learn and retain new 
information.". . . . The specification cited the prior art for the conclusion that "[d]rugs that 
can normalize these abnormalities would have a reasonable expectation of efficacy in 
Alzheimer's disease." . . . . However, the specification did not refer to any then-existing 
animal test results involving the administration of galantamine in connection with this 
animal model of Alzheimer's disease.
8
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Thus the key issue for the Federal Circuit, if we use the language of the Canadian Supreme 
Court, was whether the patent specification to one of skill in the art provided a sound 
prediction that galantamine  would be effective in treating Altzheimer’s disease as of the 
filing date? On this issue the court concluded that the answer was no explaining: 
The utility requirement prevents mere ideas from being patented. As we noted in 
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, . . ., "[p]atent protection is granted in return for an 
enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or 
may not be workable. . . . Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute 
enabling disclosure." See also In re Fisher, . . . (inventions fail to meet the utility 
requirement if their "asserted uses represent merely hypothetical possibilities, objectives 
which the claimed [inventions] . . . could possibly achieve, but none for which they have 
been used in the real world"). 
The utility requirement also prevents the patenting of a mere research proposal or an 
invention that is simply an object of research. Again as the Supreme Court stated in 
Brenner, "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but 
compensation for its successful conclusion." . . . . A process or product "which either has 
no known use or is useful only in the sense that it may be an object of scientific research" 
is not patentable. . . . As we observed in Fisher, inventions do not meet the utility 
requirement if they are "objects upon which scientific research could be performed with no 
assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the end." . . . . Allowing ideas, 
research proposals, or objects only of research to be patented has the potential to give 
priority to the wrong party and to "confer power to block off whole areas of scientific 
development, without compensating benefit to the public." Brenner, . . . (footnote 
omitted). 
Typically, patent applications claiming new methods of treatment are supported by test 
results. But it is clear that testing need not be conducted by the inventor. In addition, 
human trials are not required for a therapeutic invention to be patentable. Our predecessor 
court, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, held in In re Krimmel that 
patent applications need not "prove that compounds or other materials which [the 
applicant] is claiming, and which [the applicant] has stated are useful for 'pharmaceutical 
applications' are safe, effective, and reliable for use with humans." . . . . As we observed in 
In re Brana, "[w]ere we to require Phase II testing [human trials] in order to prove utility, 
the associated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent protection on 
promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue . . . potential cures." 
. . . . 
We have held that results from animal tests or in vitro experiments may be sufficient to 
satisfy the utility requirement. Our predecessor court held in Krimmel that animal tests 
showing that a new nonobvious compound "exhibits some useful pharmaceutical property" 
are sufficient to demonstrate utility. . . . We noted in Cross v. Iizuka that "[w]e perceive no 
insurmountable difficulty, under appropriate circumstances, in finding that the first link in 
the screening chain, in vitro testing, may establish a practical utility for the 
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[pharmaceutical] compound in question" in order for a patent to issue. . . . We concluded 
that in vitro test results for a claimed pharmaceutical compound, combined with animal 
test results for a structurally similar compound, showed "a reasonable correlation between 
the disclosed in vitro utility and an in vivo activity, and therefore a rigorous correlation is 
not necessary where the disclosure of pharmacological activity is reasonable based upon 
the probative   evidence." . . . . 
In this case, however, neither in vitro test results nor animal test results involving the 
use of galantamine to treat Alzheimer's-like conditions were provided. The results from the 
'318 patent's proposed animal tests of galantamine for treating symptoms of Alzheimer's 
disease were not available at the time of the application, and the district court properly 
held that they could not be used to establish enablement.  
Nor does Janssen contend that the prior art animal testing summarized in the '318 
patent application's specification established utility. Indeed, both in responding to the 
examiner's obviousness rejection and in responding to the obviousness defense at trial, the 
inventor (Dr. Davis) and Janssen's witnesses explicitly stated that the utility of the 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “SOUND PREDICTION”, ENABLEMENT AND 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION: ARIAD v. ELI LILLY. 
An important question for anyone seeking to understand American patent law is why the 
Federal Circuit, which has now, in its en banc decision, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,
10
 decided that the United States needed a separate description requirement for originally 
filed claims in addition to the long established enablement requirement. I suggest in this 
paper that the answer may be that at least some judges of the Federal Circuit believe that 
enablement does not include a requirement of a disclosure of a credible utility, i.e. one based 
on a “sound prediction” in spite of the panel majority decision in Janssen and cases cited in 
support of its decision. Hence, the need to create a separate written description requirement 
to deal with speculative disclosures that lack a “sound prediction”.  
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Before turning to Ariad itself it is useful to review the key case creating the description 
requirement for originally filed claims, University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.
11
 
University of California involved an early gene patent, U.S. Patent 4,652,525 (‘525).  The 
‘525 specification clearly described how the inventors had isolated the rat insulin gene, and, 
based on this method, the inventors included a prophetic example that used the same method 
to isolate the human insulin gene. Of course not having actually carried out the prophetic 
example, the inventors could not characterize the gene since they never had actually isolated 
it. Nevertheless, the application as filed specifically claimed the human insulin gene.       
The use of the prophetic example poses two questions. The first is whether the directions 
of the prophetic example would lead one of skill in the art to the human insulin gene without 
undue experimentation. Unless the answer is yes the claim is clearly invalid for lack of 
enablement. The second and more subtle question is whether, even if the answer is yes, there 
was a credible scientific belief that it would have led to the human insulin gene as of the 
invention date. In other words it could have been a lucky guess. However, the Federal Circuit 
indicated that it didn’t care whether the inventors had by this prophetic example enabled the 
human insulin gene since in any event the inventors were not in possession of the human 
insulin gene. The court explained: 
Claim 5 is directed to a recombinant procaryotic microorganism modified so that it 
contains "a nucleotide sequence having the structure of the reverse transcript of an 
mRNA of a [human], which mRNA encodes insulin." Thus, the definition of the claimed 
microorganism is one that requires human insulin-encoding cDNA. The patent describes 
a method of obtaining this cDNA by means of a constructive example, Example 6. This 
example, however, provides only a general method for obtaining the human cDNA (it 
incorporates by reference the method used to obtain the rat cDNA) along with the amino 
acid sequences of human insulin A and B chains. Whether or not it provides an enabling 
disclosure, it does not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human 
insulin, which is necessary to provide a written description of the subject matter of claim 
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5. The name cDNA is not itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys no 
distinguishing information concerning its identity. While the example provides a process 
for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, there is no further information in the patent 
pertaining to that cDNA's relevant structural or physical characteristics; in other words, it 
thus does not describe human insulin cDNA. Describing a method of preparing a cDNA 
or even describing the protein that the cDNA encodes, as the example does, does not 
necessarily describe the cDNA itself. No sequence information indicating which 
nucleotides constitute human cDNA appears in the patent, as appears for rat cDNA in 
Example 5 of the patent. Accordingly, the specification does not provide a written 




 What is clear is that one did not need to know the nucleic acid sequence of the cDNA in 
order to use it to make human insulin by inserting it into a vector for insertion into a cell for the 
purpose of having the cell make human insulin. The purpose or utility of isolating the human 
insulin gene was to make human insulin from a genetically modified bacteria. Hence, if the 
specification actually taught how to obtain the human insulin gene, there is no sound reason, 
assuming novelty and nonobviousness, for not permitting the Genentech inventors to obtain a 
claim to the isolated human insulin gene unless the prophetic example was speculative. Instead 
of expressly holding that the prophetic example was speculative as of the filing date, the Federal 
Circuit created a new requirement, written description for originally filed claims, to invalidate 
the claim to the human insulin gene. Given that the possession test used by the court required 
sequencing information, information that only could come from actual experiments, it is possible 
that the possession test as applied meant that the panel believed that even if the prophetic test 
was in fact enabling, it was the type of speculation which should not support a patent. 
Now we turn to Ariad Pharmaceuticals itself. The inventors, many of whom are world 
famous, made a number of discoveries disclosed in the patent specification including the 
discover of an important regulatory protein known as NF-kB, many details about this particular 
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protein, and most significantly for the claims in suit, methods for controlling it. The patent 
specification explains these methods of control beginning at column 3, line 54 and ending at 
column 4, line 28: 
The subject invention further relates to methods of regulating (inducing or preventing) 
activation of NF-KB, controlling expression of the immunoglobulin kappa light chain 
gene and of other genes whose expression is controlled by NF-kB (e.g., HIV). 
 
As a result of this finding, it is now possible to alter or modify the activity of NF-kB as 
an intracellular messenger and, as a result, to alter or modify the effect of a variety of 
external influences, referred to as inducing substances, whose messages are transduced 
within cells through NF-kB activity. Alteration or modification, whether to enhance or 
reduce NF-kB activity or to change its binding activity (e.g., affinity, specificity), is 
referred to herein as regulation of NF-kB activity. The present invention relates to a 
method of regulating or influencing transduction, by NF-kB, of extracellular signals into 
specific patterns of gene expression and, thus, of regulating NF-kB-mediated gene 
expression in the cells and systems in which it occurs. 
 
In particular, the present invention relates to a method of regulating (enhancing or 
diminishing) the activity of NF-kB in cells in which it is present and capable of acting as 
an intracellular messenger, as well as to substances or composition useful in such a 
method. Such methods and compositions are designed to make use of the role of NF-kB 
as a mediator in the expression of genes in a variety of cell types. The expression of a 
gene having a NF-kB binding recognition sequence can be regulated, either positively or 
negatively, to provide for increased or decreased production of the protein whose 
expression is mediated by NF-kB. NF-kB-mediated gene expression can also be 
selectively regulated by altering the binding domain of NF-kB in such a manner that 
binding specificity and/or affinity are modified. In addition, genes which do not normally 
possess NF-kB binding recognition sequences can be placed under the control of NF-kB 
by inserting an NF-k binding site in an appropriate position, to produce a construct which 
is then regulated by NF-kB. As a result of the present invention, cellular interactions 
between NF-kB and a gene or genes whose expression is mediated by NF-kB activity and 
which have, for example, medical implications (e.g., NF-kB/cytokine interactions; NF-
kB/HTLV-I tax gene product interactions) can be altered or modified. 
 
Turning now to the claims, a representative claim asserted against Lilly’s blockbuster 
drug raloxifene reads: 
95  A method for reducing, in human cells, the level of expression of genes which are 
activated by extracellular influences which induce NF-kB-mediated intracellular 
signaling, the method comprising reducing NF-kB activity in the cells such that 




Presumably when a patient ingests raloxifene, it reduces NF-kB activity in her cells which in turn 
reduces the level of expression of those genes activated by NF-kB. The utility in this case is 
either for the treatment and prevention of osteoporosis or under certain circumstances for the 
treatment or prevention of recurrent breast cancer, the FDA approved indications for raloxifene. 
One can search in vain in the specification for any suggestion of such a use or any suggestion of 
any use other than one characterized as a medical use as expressed in the following sentence 
from the previously quoted section of the specification: 
As a result of the present invention, cellular interactions between NF-kB and a gene or 
genes whose expression is mediated by NF-kB activity and which have, for example, 
medical implications (e.g., NF-kB/cytokine interactions; NF-kB/HTLV-I tax gene 
product interactions) can be altered or modified. (emphasis added). 
 
 This is a purely speculative utility and hence claim 95 should have been dismissed 
immediately as being purely speculative unless the Federal Circuit considers a speculative 
disclosure that is ultimately shown to be true sufficient for enablement, a belief held by Sir 
Nicholas Pumfrey, but apparently rejected by the majority of the panel in Janssen. In Ariad it 
turns out that there is a medical use for the method. As for enablement even if we accept the 
prediction that did prove accurate that the inventors’ work did have medical implications as 
sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement, there plainly was no enablement of at least the broad 
scope of the invention. With respect to enablement the specification had only the following to 
say beginning on column 37, line 43 and ending at column 38, line 22: 
Negative regulation can be effected in an analogous manner. For example, a specific 
inhibitor molecule which is able to block (reduce or eliminate) NF-kB binding can be 
added to the biological system in an effective amount. Preferably, this inhibitor is specific 
for NF-k and does not interact with other cell constituents. An example of such a 
molecule is I-kB. 
 
Alternatively, negative regulation can be effected using "decoy" molecules, which are 
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designed to mimic a region of the gene whose expression would normally be induced by 
NF-kB. In this case, NF-kB would bind the decoy and, thus, not be available to bind its 
natural target. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of an inhibitor molecule which is also a protein, the gene 
encoding the inhibitor molecule can be identified, isolated, and cloned into an appropriate 
expression vector using common methodology. When introduced into an appropriate 
biological system, the inhibitor molecule is synthesized and functions to interact with 
NF-kB with its binding site and as a consequence reducing the level of transcription of 
the gene containing the NF-kB binding site. 
 
Yet another method for negatively regulating the expression of a gene containing an NF-
kB binding domain involves the introduction of an effective amount of a decoy sequence 
encoding the NF-kB binding domain. The decoy sequence serves as an unproductive 
binding domain with which the NF-kB molecule binds. As the finite number of NF-kB 
molecules bind to the decoy sequences, the number which bind productively (result in 
increased transcription) with an intact gene, decreases. 
 
Negative regulation can also be effected by the introduction of "dominantly interfering” 
molecules (see e.g., Friedman et al., Nature, 335:452-454 (1988). For example, if the 
DNA binding domain and the DNA polymerase activating domain of NF-kB are spatially 
distinct in the molecule, a truncated form of the NF-kB molecule can be synthesized, 
using well known techniques. A preferred embodiment would be a truncated molecule 
retaining the DNA binding domain, but lacking the RNA polymerase activating domain. 
Such a "dominantly interfering” molecule would recognize and bind to the NF-kB 
binding site, however, the binding would be non-productive. Because the activation 
portion of NF-kB would be required for enhanced transcription, the truncated molecule 
would exert no positive effect. Furthermore, its occupation of the NF-kB binding site 
effectively blocks access to any intact NF-kB molecule which may be present in the cell. 
 
The first suggestion cannot be questioned as it uses the I-kB molecule, the molecule that 
binds to NF-kB in cells in humans. Hence the specification unambiguously teaches the use of 
one molecule which has medical implications assuming it could be delivered through injection or 
in pill form to the cells of the patient. However, there is absolutely no evidence now or at the 
time of filing that it could  be used in any form as a drug. The rest of the possible drugs represent 
at best a research project. In addition, let us return to raloxifine to show how far away the 




Raloxifine is an estrogen agonist/antagonist, commonly referred to as a selective estrogen 
receptor modulator (SERM) that belongs to the benzothiophene class of compounds. Apparently 
it has been shown to reduce NK-kB activity in some of the cells of the patients. Also according 
to Ariad one could without undue experimentation have identified raloxifene, but there is no 
suggestion anywhere that it would have medicinal uses beyond mere speculation. Hence there 
was no need to invent a new doctrine to deal with the problem of explaining why claim 95 was 
not patentable unless the fact that the method ultimately has a medical use is sufficient.  It would 
appear therefore that the new possession doctrine (description) for originally filed claims may 
simply be needed to insure that speculative disclosures cannot be the basis for a valid claim. If 
this is the case as I believe it is, the Federal Circuit should have simply said so as did the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Wellcome and a panel majority in Janssen rather than creating a 
new, mysterious and unnecessary doctrine called possession (description) for originally filed 
claims. 
